Defenders of intellectual property rights argue that these rights are justified because creators and inventors deserve compensation for their labour, because their ideas and expressions are their personal property and because the total amount of creative work and innovation increases when inventors and creators have a prospect of generating high income through the exploitation of their monopoly rights. This view is not only widely accepted by the general public, but also enforced through a very effective international legal framework. And it (...) is endorsed by most academic researchers and commentators in this field. In this essay, I will show that the classical arguments for the justification of private intellectual property rights can be contested, and that there are many good reasons to abolish intellectual property rights completely in favour of an intellectual commons where every person is allowed to use every cultural expression and invention in whatever way he wishes. I will first give a short overview of the classical arguments for the justification of intellectual property as they are usually stated. We will then discuss the question of whether the creator or inventor deserves his de jure monopoly, by using John Christman’s categories of income and control rights to analyse property rights. The aim here is to show that it does not make sense to create control rights for abstract objects, as they are not scarce, and that there is no logical connection between the surplus which may be generated through income rights and the labour which has been put into a cultural artefact or an invention, and therefore it is not justified to grant monopoly rights on the basis of Lockean natural rights arguments for self-ownership and the just appropriation of worldly resources. As it is possible to reject Christman’s property rights categories, I will then go on to show on the basis of Richard Dawkins’ postulation of the ‘meme’ and Ludwik Fleck’s theory of the ‘thought collective’ that creative processes should be interpreted as interpersonal or collective processes, and therefore it is not justified to grant intellectual property rights to individuals on the basis of the idea that the individual who has put labour into the creative work or the invention should be the one to whom the contents of the work belong exclusively. As it is still possible to postulate the utilitarian argument that intellectual property rights are just because they increase the amount of creative works and inventions, I will argue in the last chapter that, from a libertarian as well as from an egalitarian point of view, the justification of intellectual monopoly rights on utilitarian grounds cannot be maintained. Therefore it is time to abolish the current global intellectual property law regime in favour of an intellectual commons for the good of all human beings and societies. (shrink)

Entscheidungen verweisen in einem begrifflichen Sinne auf Gründe. Entscheidungssysteme bieten eine probabilistische Verlässlichkeit als Rechtfertigung von Empfehlungen an. Doch nicht für alle Situationen mögen Verlässlichkeitsgründe auch angemessene Gründe sein. Damit eröffnet sich die Idee, die Güte von Gründen von ihrer Angemessenheit zu unterscheiden. Der Aufsatz betrachtet an einem Beispiel, einem KI-Lügendetektor, die Frage, ob eine (zumindest aktuell nicht gegebene) hohe Verlässlichkeit den Einsatz rechtfertigen kann. Gleicht er nicht einem Richter, der anhand einer Statistik Urteile fällen würde?

The paper analyses how knowledge claims can be extrapolated from laboratory situation to more complex situations. It argues that claims by Tetens, Knorr-Cetina and Cartwright that put doubts on extrapolation are unwarrented.

According to Descartes, physics rests on metaphysics. Various possible interpretations of this metaphor are considered. I will show that only a weak interpretation can be brought into accordance with other parts of Descartes' philosophy. According to the weak interpretation, physics has to presuppose metaphysics because the latter shows that contrary to widespread contemporary arguments the concepts of mathematical physics are adequate to describe nature. It is argued for this position by comparing the Regulae, where Descartes did not make use of (...) metaphysical arguments, with the Principia, where he did. (shrink)

In the spirit of Fontenelle's "Dialogues des morts", Dorschel stages an imaginary conversation between 18th century composer Joseph Haydn and 20th century composer Anton von Webern. In the section of Hades reserved for composers, they confront their different musical poetics.

The study pursues, in a historical as well as in a systematic-analytical way, the reading of Descartes' philosophy as a project of a fundamental critique of theology and transcendence. Besides the exclusion of everything 'theological' from the field of rational discourse and its relegation to the field of fideism, this also involves the reinterpretation of the concept of 'God' as Descartes uses it, in a sense that is to be purified of transcendental, but especially of theistic implications.

What does it mean to be conservative? What could it mean in the arts? Whoever merely conserves works of art may be a collector but is not an artist. Brahms’s trio op. 40 conserves the hand horn idiom. Yet its aesthetics will not be captured by the opposition of ‘conservative’ versus ‘progressive’. What is superior in terms of technology, Brahms maintained, need not be superior in terms of art.

Neuere Interpretationen von Leibniz' Notizen zur Metaphysik aus den Jahren 1675-1676 tendieren dazu, diese Texte im Licht eines spinozistischen Substanz-Monismus zu lesen. Obwohl es für eine solche Interpretation überzeugende Anhaltspunkte gibt, vertritt Leibniz jedoch in denselben Texten auch einen Substanzen-Pluralismus in Bezug auf geistige Substanzen. Substanz-Monismus und Substanzen-Pluralismus scheinen miteinander vereinbar zu sein, weil für Leibniz, ähnlich wie für Descartes in den Principia philosophiae, der Terminus ‚Substanz‛ nicht in univoker Weise von Gott und von Gegenständen in der Welt ausgesagt werden (...) kann. (shrink)

In den Elementa juris naturalis behauptet Leibniz, dass es rational ist zu präsumieren, dass eine gegebene Handlung gerecht ist. Diese Behauptung scheint in Widerspruch zu seiner Auffassung zu stehen, dass das, was präsumiert wird, einfacher ist als sein Gegenteil. Nach Leibniz ist einfacher, was weniger Voraussetzungen hat als etwas anderes, wobei er zwischen logischen und ontologischen Voraussetzungen unterscheidet. Dieser Diskussionsbeitrag versucht zu zeigen, dass Voraussetzungen auf der ontologischen Ebene eine oft übersehene Rolle für die Präsumption der Gerechtigkeit einer Handlung spielen (...) und dass sich der scheinbare Widerspruch auf dieser Ebene auflösen lässt. Nach Leibniz ist eine gerechte Handlung eine spezielle Art von Möglichkeit: eine Handlung, die für eine moralische Person möglich ist. Ihm zufolge hat aber ein mögliches Ereignis weniger ontologische Voraussetzungen als ein unmögliches Ereignis, weil die ontologischen Voraussetzungen eines möglichen Ereignisses ein Teil der Voraussetzungen eines unmöglichen Ereignisses sind. Die Präsumption zu Gunsten der Gerechtigkeit einer Handlung lässt sich als Spezialfall der Präsumption zu Gunsten der Möglichkeit eines Ereignisses auffassen. (shrink)

This contribution provides a transcription and translation of, and a commentary on, a letter of the German-Dutch-Japanese polymath Peter Hartzing to Gerhard Wolter Molanus, abbot of Loccum and famous collector of coins and medals. In the commentary, a survey of the life and intellectual endeavours of Hartzing is provided.

Theorien von Gerechtigkeit als einer ethischen Tugend spielen eine große Rolle in der protestantischen Ethik vor dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg. Eines der hervorstechenden Merkmale dieser Theorien ist ihr eklektischer Charakter: Sie verbinden Elemente aus verschiedenen Traditionen der antiken Tugendethik, vor allem der platonischen, aristotelischen und stoischen. Die Gerechtigkeitstheorien von protestantischen Philosophen wie Rudolph Goclenius, Clemens Timpler und Bartholomäus Keckermann illustrieren gut dokumentierte Merkmale des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus wie die Rolle der Reinterpretation von ausgewählten Lehrstücken und die konziliatorische Strategie, scheinbare Widersprüche zwischen verschiedenen (...) Traditionen aufzulösen. Darüber hinaus illustrieren sie aber auch ein weniger gut dokumentiertes Merkmal des frühneuzeitlichen Eklektizismus, nämlich seine Funktion als philosophische Problemlösungsstrategie. Dieser Artikel versucht zu zeigen, wie Goclenius, Timpler und Keckermann einerseits Elemente aus den platonischen (und stoischen) Traditionen nutzen, um diagnostizierte Probleme in der aristotelischen Tradition zu beheben und andererseits Elemente aus der aristotelischen Tradition verwenden, um Probleme in der platonischen Tradition zu lösen. (shrink)

To call a piece of music sad or joyous need not imply reference to a subjective state. Speaking in this vein, we do not have to attribute sad or joyous feelings to the composer or to the performer. Nor do we predict that listeners will become sad or joyful when they will listen to a performance of that composition. Musical expression is not a mode of consciousness in those who produce it and it is not an effect of music either. (...) Rather, it is a feature of the music itself. Once we have discarded the psychological reduction of expression, the way may be clear to explore the intricate relation between expression and subjectivity. Friedrich von Hausegger’s Music as Expression (1885/87) stands out among the guides to be recommended for a journey along that path. (shrink)

Das Buch ist ein Beitrag zur aktuellen philosophischen Debatte über das anthropologisch-epistemologische Fundament moralischer Normen. Es werden zwei unterschiedliche Modelle vorgestellt: zum einen die Autonomie-Konzeption Kants, die auf dem Begriff des freien Willens gründet, der sich selbst dem Vernunftgesetz unterstellt; zum anderen die von Platon inspirierte Moralphilosophie Iris Murdochs, in der die moralische Sehkraft, die sich an der aufmerksamen Wahrnehmung des konkreten Einzelnen orientiert, im Mittelpunkt des guten Lebens steht. In der Auseinandersetzung mit den beiden Entwürfen werden deren Stärken und (...) Schwächen deutlich. Die Arbeit mündet in einen Vorschlag, wie Kants und Murdochs Grundintuitionen konstruktiv miteinander versöhnt werden können. (shrink)

Blumenbergs Paradigmen zu einer Metaphorologie sind bekannt für die Entdeckung absoluter Metaphern. Zahlreiche systematische Fragen mögen dabei offen geblieben sein, etwa die nach verschiedenen Typen1 von Metaphern oder den Methoden ihrer Interpretation, so dass schon bezweifelt wurde, ob es sich überhaupt um eine Metapherntheorie handle.2 Immerhin: Dass es absolute Metaphern gibt, was diese sind und woran sie erkannt werden können, wird von Blumenberg in großer Prägnanz und anhand zahlreicher Beispiele dargestellt. Wenn es eine unangetastete Gewissheit in der Blumenbergrezeption gibt, so (...) scheint sie hierin zu finden zu sein. Dennoch möchte ich erneut die Frage an Blumenbergs Text stellen: In welchem Sinn ist eine Metapher absolut? Auf den ersten Blick mag diese Frage überraschen, da sie einen der offensichtlichsten Gedanken Blumenbergs berührt: Eine absolute Metapher ist nach Blumenberg eine solche, die sich nicht in Begriffe rückübersetzen lässt. In diesem Sinne wird sie von ihm als absolut charakterisiert. Warum halte ich dennoch diese Frage für berechtigt? Das wird am besten anhand einer Alternative verdeutlicht: Ist die absolute Metapher ein Ausdruck in einem fremden Kontext, wie Blumenbergs zahlreiche Exempel nahelegen (die Kraft der Wahrheit, die nackte Wahrheit), oder ist die absolute Metapher gleichsam die jeweilige ganze Theorie, bündelt sich in ihr der gesamte Text? Auf den ersten Blick mag diese Alternative paradox erscheinen. Vorgreifend sei der ihr zugrundeliegende Gedanke erläutert: Blumenbergs Darstellung der Fundstellen legt zunächst die erste Lesart nahe. Demnach wäre die absolute Metapher das Vorkommen eines Ausdrucks (wie »Kraft« oder »nackt«) in einem Kontext, in den sie zunächst nicht passt (Wahrheit). Die Metapher wäre dann zwar nicht ein Ausdruck allein, sondern ein Ausdruck in einem ihm fremden Kontext; sie wiese jedoch Grenzen auf. Wie unbestimmt diese auch verliefen, ob sie weiter oder enger anzusetzen wäre, sie wäre lokalisier- und daher identifizierbar. Die zweite Lesart motiviert sich zunächst dadurch, dass Blumenberg vorführt, dass eine absolute Metapher gegeben sein kann, ohne dass sie als Ausdruck in einem Text vorkommt. Sie bildet dann dessen »implikatives Modell«; das heißt, sie stellt den Hintergrund der Begriffsbildung dar und entwirft das Verhältnis von Selbst und Welt. Was zunächst einen Sonderfall darstellt (Metapher ohne Ausdruck), verweist jedoch auf eine allgemeine Eigenschaft absoluter Metaphern bei Blumenberg: Diese sind Modelle für das Verhältnis von Ich und Welt und erfüllen dadurch theoretische und pragmatische Funktionen. Als solche ist die absolute Metapher nicht auf ein lokales Vorkommen begrenzt, sondern durchdringt den Text als solchen. Beide Möglichkeiten stehen in einem Gegensatz zueinander. Gleichwohl gibt es einen ver- mittelnden Gedanken: Die absolute Metapher (als Strukturzusammenhang des gesamten Textes verstanden) kann sich gleichsam in einem Ausdruck manifestieren, verdichten und selbst bezeichnen. Aber das Vorkommen von absoluten Metaphern wäre an das Vorkommen von Ausdrücken in einem fremden Kontext nicht gebunden. Die Diskussion dieser Frage steht im Zentrum des Beitrags (Abschnitte 1–2), sie hat Konsequenzen für zwei Gedanken (Abschnitte 3–4), die in ihrem Licht vielleicht klarer hervortreten. (shrink)

Orientierung steht am Anfang von allem, ohne selbst ein greifbarer Anfang zu sein. Als Letzt- und Grundbegriff geht sie jedem Denken und jeder Lebenstätigkeit voraus und ermöglicht sie. Dennoch war sie selbst bislang kaum Gegenstand philosophischer Reflexion. In seiner Philosophie der Orientierung macht Werner Stegmaier – bekannt durch seine Beiträge zu Nietzsche, Dilthey, Luhmann und Levinas – sie zum Ausgangspunkt, um die Philosophie selbst im Hinblick auf ihr praktisches, lebensweltliches Potential hin neu zu denken. Das breite Spektrum des Sich-Orientierens und (...) des Orientiert-Seins im Denken, die Bedingungen und Strategien der Orientierung im Alltag und ihr Ziel, die Ungewissheit, das Grundproblem der Orientierung, zu bewältigen, werden von ihm in die Perspektive der Philosophiegeschichte gestellt und im Blick auf aktuelle philosophische Fragestellungen systematisch untersucht. Die Beiträge des Bandes, abgerundet von einem Nachwort Werner Stegmaiers, eröffnen diesem genuinen Ansatz einen breiten Reflexions- und Diskussionsraum und zeigen so seine Bedeutsamkeit nicht nur für die Philosophie im Ganzen, sondern auch über ihre Grenzen hinaus. (shrink)

Phänomenologie intendiert allgemein eine Beschreibung und intersubjektiv nachvollziehbare Analyse der in einer konkreten Situation sich erschließenden Phänomene des menschlichen Bewußtseins. Klinische Phänomenologie hat darüber hinaus die therapeutische Situation zu berücksichtigen. Im Folgenden wird die These vertreten, daß die psychische Verfassung eines Menschen niemals allein aufgrund einer rein phänomenologischen Analyse auf alle praktisch und therapeutisch relevanten Konsequenzen hin ergründet werden kann. Das kann insbesondere dann nicht der Fall sein, wenn sich solche Konsequenzen aus einem außerhalb der konkreten Situation gewonnenen, empirisch verallgemeinerbaren (...) psychopathologischen Wissen ergeben. Die Integration wird am ehesten dadurch ermöglicht, dass in einer vorausgehenden Analyse der therapeutischen Situation unterschiedliche "Sinnebenen" beachtet werden. Mit einem solchen klinisch-phänomenologischen Ansatz ist die reine Phänomenologie der Bewußtseinsphänomene überschritten, jedoch ergibt sich eben dadurch die Möglichkeit, die jeder praxisbezogenen Wissenschaft inhärenten "Aporien der praktischen Vernunft" darzulegen. Ohne eine solche vorausgehende Analyse der therapeutischen Situation bleibt die Gefahr einer subjektivitischen oder auch objektivistischen Vereinseitigung der Positionen bestehen, wie wir sie aus der jüngeren Psychiatriegeschichte kennen. Um eine Urteils-, Entscheidungs- und Handlungskompetenz im Bereich der klinischen Psychiatrie zu gewährleisten, bedarf es zusätzlich ethischer Maßstäbe und Kriterien, die sich auf der Grundlage eines von dogmatischen Vorstellungen freien Menschenbildes begründen lassen. (shrink)

Reseña de Lou Andreas-Salomé, Friedrich Nietzsche in seinen Werken (Herausgegeben und mit einem Nachwort versehen von Daniel Unger). Taching am See: MedienEdition Welsch, 2019, p. 399.

Baseado na perspectiva da geofilosofia de Deleuze e Guattari em um processo que se sobrepõe à relação envolvendo sujeito e objeto enquanto fronteira do pensamento e que implica o pensamento como desdobramento de uma violência e as formações genealógicas do saber, o artigo se detém na análise do paradoxal mundo do Instituto Benjamenta (1995) em uma construção fílmica adaptada do romance Jakob von Gunten, de Robert Walser, que encerra um movimento que traz como conteúdo a matéria que se impõe (...) ao caos imanente e converge para o horizonte que abrange Arte, Filosofia e Ciência. Dessa forma, convergindo para a questão que encerra a imagem ortodoxa, dogmática, pré-filosófica, natural e moral do pensamento, o artigo recorre ao filme Instituto Benjamenta (1995) enquanto construção que assinala a intersecção de séries infinitas de imagens de pensamento que escapam ao horizonte da circunscrição da visualidade através de inter-relações ilimitadas que emergem carregadas de complexidade em um processo que defende a superação das imagens dogmáticas do pensamento e da mera exposição do conteúdo do arcabouço histórico do pensamento enquanto objeto que tende à reprodução de ideias e noções e implica a “repetição” de interpretações na relação de ensino e aprendizagem, impedindo o exercício de criação de conceitos, característica da Filosofia, segundo Deleuze, convergindo para a necessidade da instauração de uma experiência capaz de viabilizar a emergência do “novo” através das possibilidades suscitadas no acontecimento da construção do conhecimento. (shrink)

Baseado na perspectiva da geofilosofia de Deleuze e Guattari em um processo que se sobrepõe à relação envolvendo sujeito e objeto enquanto fronteira do pensamento e que implica o pensamento como desdobramento de uma violência e as formações genealógicas do saber, o artigo se detém na análise do paradoxal mundo do Instituto Benjamenta em uma construção fílmica adaptada do romance Jakob von Gunten, de Robert Walser, que encerra um movimento que traz como conteúdo a matéria que se impõe ao (...) caos imanente e converge para o horizonte que abrange Arte, Filosofia e Ciência. Dessa forma, convergindo para a questão que encerra a imagem ortodoxa, dogmática, pré-filosófica, natural e moral do pensamento, o artigo recorre ao filme Instituto Benjamenta enquanto construção que assinala a intersecção de séries infinitas de imagens de pensamento que escapam ao horizonte da circunscrição da visualidade através de inter-relações ilimitadas que emergem carregadas de complexidade em um processo que defende a superação das imagens dogmáticas do pensamento e da mera exposição do conteúdo do arcabouço histórico do pensamento enquanto objeto que tende à reprodução de ideias e noções e implica a “repetição” de interpretações na relação de ensino e aprendizagem, impedindo o exercício de criação de conceitos, característica da Filosofia, segundo Deleuze, convergindo para a necessidade da instauração de uma experiência capaz de viabilizar a emergência do “novo” através das possibilidades suscitadas no acontecimento da construção do conhecimento. (shrink)

Seit 2018 regt sich im anglo-amerikanischen Raum vermehrt das Interesse, Sport als quasi-rechtliches Regelsystem zu untersuchen. Man geht davon aus, dass die Probleme und Lösungen in Sportsystemen den Vergleich mit Rechtssystemen erlauben. Tagungen, Aufsätze und Bücher zum Thema „Jurisprudence of Sport“ deuten darauf hin, dass hier ein neuer Forschungsbereich entsteht. Dieser Beitrag bietet eine Einführung in die Thematik.

Mit Beiträgen von Gerhard Vollmer, Dirk Koppelberg, Stephen Stich, W. v. O. Quine, Ansgar Beckermann, Dirk Hartmann und Rainer Lange, Mircea Flonta, Geert Keil, Peter Simons, Andreas Kemmerling, Lynne R. Baker, Holm Tetens und Peter Janich.

Rezension zu: Andreas Urs Sommer, Was bleibt von Nietzsches Philosophie?, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin 2018.

This chapter uncovers a less investigated aspect of the relationship between the two most important scholastic schools of the Renaissance, Thomism and Scotism: the influence of Scotist literature on distinctions as seen in some sixteenth-century Thomists. The chapter has a primary focus on Chrysostomus Javelli’s engagement in his discussion of divine attributes with the Scotist doctrine of distinctions, but also considers other Thomist sources. First, the beginnings of the highly specialised Scotist literature on distinctions are traced back to the start (...) of the fourteenth century; I show how some early followers of Duns Scotus, in particular Francis of Meyronnes and Petrus Thomae, systematised Scotus’ ontology of the various grades of being by compiling lists of subtle distinctions to be applied to various levels of reality. I give some indications as to the later reception of these models of distinctions in the Scotist school. Special attention is paid to Étienne Brulefer, since his summary of Petrus Thomae’s model of seven distinctions was Javelli’s source for the Scotist doctrine. I then investigate how Javelli worked with Brulefer’s summary, and how he sought to integrate the Scotist doctrine into his own discussion of divine attributes. Thomists traditionally allowed only a rational or mental kind of distinction among divine attributes, and between them and the divine essence. Javelli, however, endeavours to show how the Thomist position may be reconciled with the Scotist doctrine of a formal or ex natura rei distinction. He did not always endorse this conciliatory approach; I hypothesise that he changed his mind on the subject over time. Finally, I show how other Renaissance Thomists reacted to the Scotist system of distinctions; in particular, I draw attention to the Thomists Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, Bartolomeo Manzoli, and Mattia Gibboni da Aquario, who all wrote treatises on Thomist distinction theory modelled on the Scotist system of distinctions. In some of this literature, lists of distinctions based on Thomist metaphysics were compiled in order to replace the Scotist system. I argue that Javelli’s approach is more conciliatory and, in fact, has some overlap with the concordist thought of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, who himself considered Scotus and Aquinas to be in fundamental agreement as regards the distinction between divine attributes. (shrink)

Indem dieser Band sich auf das Verhältnis von Naturerkennen und Natursein konzentriert, thematisiert er einen wesentlichen Ausschnitt aus dem weiten Spektrum von Böhmes philosophischer Arbeit. Um die Naturthematik möglichst breit zu entfalten und für Querverbindungen offenzuhalten, ist der vorliegende Band in drei Abschnitte gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt stehen Charakter und Reichweite der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis von Natur im Mittelpunkt. Der zweite Teil des Bandes stellt alternative Perspektiven auf Natur vor. Im dritten Teil schließlich stehen der Mensch und sein Verhältnis zu sich (...) selbst im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen. Inhaltsverzeichnis Krohn, Wolfgang: Wissenschaftsentwicklung zwischen Dezentrierung und Dekonstruktion. Stehr, Nico: Von den Grenzen der Macht wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Schäfer, Wolf: Zweifel am Ende des Baconschen Zeitalters. Kamper, Dietmar: Wissen ist Ohnmacht. Macht ist Unwissen. Gamm, der Technik. Janich, Peter: Zeit und Natur. Kimmerle, Heinz: »Es ist Zeit, daß es Zeit wird«. Wie kann Zeit Zeit werden? Schiemann, Gregor: Natur auf dem Rückzug. Zur Relevanz der aristotelischen Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik. Hauskeller, Michael: Ist Schönheit eine Atmosphäre?. Zur Bestimmung des landschaftlich Schönen. Schmitz, Hermann: Situationen und Atmosphären. Zur Ästhetik und Onthologie bei Gernot Böhme. Rehmann-Sutter, Christoph: Über Relationalität. Was ist das »Ökologische« in der Naturästhetik? Meyer-Abich, Klaus Michael: Erinnerung an die natürliche Mitwelt. Andreas-Griesebach, Manon: Idee plus Erfahrung. Goethes Begründung eines neuen Typs von Naturwissenschaft. Engelhardt, Dietrich von: Madame de Stael über Naturphilosophie, Naturwissenschaft und Medizin in De l'Allemagne. Deneke, Michael: Schramm, Engelbert: »Soziale Naturwissenschaft«. Zwischen Sozialwissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften. Böhme, Hartmut: Enthüllen und Verhüllen des Körpers. Biblische, mythische und künstlerische Deutungen des Nackten. Lippe, Rudolf zur: Eine Logik des gestischen Wissens. Müller, Rudolf Wolfgang: Gernot Böhme - Anima naturaliter japonica. Hoffmann, Gisbert: Das menschliche Sein als mediales. Martens, Ekkehard: »Natürlich« denken?. Heideggers Pseudosokratismus als Irrationalismus. Fleischer, Helmut: Naturalität ohne Naturalismus. Zum lebensweltlichen Fundus jeder höheren Erkenntnis-Artistik. Gerhard: Technik als Medium. Grundlinien einer Philosophie. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Ethics: A Radical-constructivist Approach” by Andreas Quale. Upshot: The first of my two main goals in this commentary is to establish thinking of ethics as concepts rather than as non-cognitive knowledge. The second is to argue that establishing models of individuals’ ethical concepts is a scientific enterprise that is quite similar to establishing models of individuals’ mathematical concepts. To accomplish these two primary goals, I draw from my experience of working scientifically with von (...) Glasersfeld for 25 years while he was developing radical constructivism as a coherent model of knowing, and appeal to several of his basic insights to establish constructing models of ethical concepts as a scientific enterprise. (shrink)

Andrea Cesalpino is an important figure in the history of science. He demonstrated that blood circulates into heart from veins and from the heart to arteries, paving the way to Harvey’s complete description of blood circulation. Moreover, he was the founder of botany as a systematic discipline, which he based, rather than on the observation of accidental similarities of plants, on the discovery of their vegetative-generative principle. In philosophy, he attempted to conciliate the immortality of the soul (i.e., the form (...) of the body) with the existence of a unique immaterial intellect, which is individuated and multiplied in the singular souls that participate to it. (shrink)

El kitsch no es solo una categoría que ha definido una de las posibles gramáticas estéticas de la modernidad, sino también una dimensión antropológica que ha tenido diferentes configuraciones en el curso de los procesos históricos. El ensayo ofrece una mirada histórico-crítica sobre las transformaciones que condujeron desde el kitsch de principios del siglo XX hasta el neokitsch contemporáneo: desde la génesis del kitsch hasta su afirmación como una de las manifestaciones más tangibles de la cultura de masas. Integrándose con (...) la estética posmoderna, el kitsch se transforma en neokitsch, una estética que utiliza el kitsch como su propia sintaxis en el complejo escenario de la estética contemporánea. /// -/- Kitsch is not just a category that has defined one of the possible aesthetic grammars of modernity, but also an anthropological dimension that has had different configurations in the course of historical processes. The essay offers a historical-critical look at the transformations that led from the early twentieth century kitsch to the contemporary neokitsch: from the genesis of kitsch to its affirmation as one of the most tangible manifestations of mass culture. Integrating with postmodern aesthetics, kitsch turns into neokitsch, an aesthetic that deliberately uses kitsch as its own syntax in the complex scenario of contemporary aesthetics. (shrink)

This paper delves into the use of machine learning-based systems in decision-making processes and its implications for moral responsibility as traditionally defined. It focuses on the emergence of responsibility gaps and examines proposed strategies to address them. The paper aims to provide an introductory and comprehensive overview of the ongoing debate surrounding moral responsibility in automated decision-making. By thoroughly examining these issues, we seek to contribute to a deeper understanding of the implications of AI integration in society.

This chapter focuses on the role of the imagination in creativity, using aphantasia as a case study. It first distinguishes between imagination and mental imagery, before giving an overview of what we know about aphantasia to date, focusing in particular on findings pertaining to creativity, imagination, and memory. It then turns to the role of the imagination in creativity, agreeing with philosophers that the imagination plays an essential role in creativity, which allows individuals to imagine a multitude of possibilities. This (...) view is then supplemented with a theory of the neuro-cognitive underpinnings of the imagination, whereby both the imagination and memory are supported by the same neural network – the default mode network. Finally, the chapter argues that this fuller picture allows us to understand the creative abilities of people with aphantasia, thoroughly resisting the thought that they might generally be unimaginative or uncreative. (shrink)

I show that there are good reasons to think that some individuals without any capacity for consciousness should be counted as welfare subjects, assuming that desire-fulfilment is a welfare good and that any individuals who can accrue welfare goods are welfare subjects. While other philosophers have argued for similar conclusions, I show that they have done so by relying on a simplistic understanding of the desire-fulfilment theory. My argument is intended to be sensitive to the complexities and nuances of contemporary (...) developments of the theory, while avoiding highly counter-intuitive implications of previous arguments for the same conclusion. (shrink)

According to a view called 'nihilism', sentences containing vague expressions cannot strictly speaking be true or false, because they lack definite truth conditions. While most theorists of vagueness tend to regard nihilism as a hopeless view, a few isolated attempts have been made to defend it. This paper aims to develop such attempts in a new direction by showing how nihilism, once properly spelled out, can meet three crucial explanatory challenges that respectively concern truth, assertibility, and communication.

Estética difusa es la fórmula que sintetiza la omnipresencia de los fenómenos estéticos en el escenario actual: superada la larga fase del dominio exclusivo del arte como parámetro de los valores estéticos, la contemporaneidad se ha reconocido en una pluralidad de prácticas en las que también lo no estético es pensado y experimentado como estético. El ensayo se propone explorar los aspectos teóricos de este proceso en el que consumo material y consumo in-material confluyen en un único escenario, cotidiano y (...) omnipresente. Esta de-finición de una estética globalizada, en la que se activa plenamente el papel de lo estético en la cultura del consumo, ha configurado, en primer lugar, la opo-sición entre la estetización y la estética de lo cotidiano; en segundo lugar, un enfoque ideológico y crítico; y, por último, una perspectiva más vinculada a la experiencia estética de las prácticas del mundo de la vida contemporánea. (shrink)

After the attempt at collaboration between the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle failed in the late 1930s, Adorno stood at the forefront of critical theory’s polemics against ‘positivism’. Given these later polemical exchanges, some of the tendencies common to both movements have remained overlooked. Among these is their opposition to the phenomenological tradition. This paper focusses on certain features common to Schlick’s and Adorno’s critical responses to Husserl. The Machians, including Adorno’s supervisor Hans Cornelius, were targeted by Husserl’s onslaught (...) against psychologism in 1900. The young Schlick’s Machian background had motivated his contribution to the Psychologismusstreit, in the context of which he launched a series of objections against Husserl’s ‘independence theory of truth’. Adorno’s later doctoral dissertation under Cornelius was also motivated by the effort to defend his master against Husserl’s objections. Schlick’s criticisms intensified in later works, where Husserl’s epistemology of intuition is seen as yet another instance of the widespread confusion between knowledge and acquaintance. Schlick’s warnings against Husserl’s turn towards the irrationalist fashions of his day find their echo in Adorno’s ‘Metakritik’. Apart from their broad agreement in how they understand Husserl’s positioning within his context, Schlick and Adorno also develop a similar criticism of Husserl’s account of intuition as failing in its aspiration to discover unmediated givenness, which it confuses with mediated conceptual knowledge. Unfortunately, while Adorno explicitly acknowledges Schlick’s critique of Husserl, he also misconstrues it as a scientistic rejection of metaphysical nonsense, thus failing to acknowledge the proximity to his approach. (shrink)

We define a formal semantics of conditionals based on _normatively ideal worlds_. Such worlds are described informally by Armgardt (Gabbay D, Magnani L, Park W, Pietarinen A-V (eds) Natural arguments: a tribute to john woods, College Publications, London, pp 699–708, 2018) to address well-known problems of the counterfactual approach to causation. Drawing on Armgardt’s proposal, we use iterated conditionals in order to analyse causal relations in scenarios of multi-agent interaction. This results in a refined counterfactual approach to causal responsibility in (...) legal contexts, which solves overdetermination problems in an intuitively accessible manner. (shrink)

While COVID-19 vaccines provide light at the end of the tunnel in a difficult time, they also bring forth the complex ethical issue of global vaccine distribution. The current unequal global distribution of vaccines is unjust towards the vulnerable living in low-income countries. A vaccine tax should be introduced to remedy this. Under such a scheme, a small fraction of the money spent by a country on vaccines for its own population would go into a fund, such as COVAX, dedicated (...) to buying vaccines and distributing them to the world’s poorest. A vaccine tax would provide a much-needed injection of funds to remedy the unequal distribution of vaccines. The tax allows for a distribution that, to a lesser degree, reflects the ability to pay and is superior to a donation-based model because it minimises the opportunity for free-riding. (shrink)

Hassoun argues that the poor in the world have a right to health and that the Global Health Impact Index provides consumers in well-off countries with the opportunity to ensure that more people have access to essential medicines. Because of this, these consumers would be ethically obliged to purchase Global Health Impact Index-labeled products in the face of existing global inequalities. In presenting her argument, Hassoun rejects the so-called democratic account of ethical consumption in favor of the positive change account. (...) Two versions of the democratic change account are relevant. One underscores the importance of democratic procedures and institutions, while the other stresses our fundamental moral equality. While at least one prominent institutionalist account has problems, revised versions would be less vulnerable to Hassoun’s counterexamples. Furthermore, institutionalist accounts come with the epistemological gains from democratic procedures and deliberations, which may be especially important under uncertainty. Finally, and perhaps more challenging for the Global Health Impact index project, this measure may place the burden unfairly on those who need to buy medicines. This is a pivotal insight from the non-institutionalist version of the democratic account of ethical consumption. (shrink)

Age-based rationing remains highly controversial. This question has been paramount during the Covid-19 pandemic. Analyzing the practices, proposals, and guidelines applied or put forward during the current pandemic, three kinds of age-based rationing are identified: an age-based cut-off, age as a tiebreaker, and indirect age rationing, where age matters to the extent that it affects prognosis. Where age is allowed to play a role in terms of who gets treated, it is justified either because this is believed to maximize benefits (...) from scarce resources or because it is believed to be in accordance with the value of fairness understood as (a) fair innings, where less priority is given to those who have lived a full life or (b) an egalitarian concern for the worse off. By critically assessing prominent frameworks and practices for pandemic rationing, this article considers the balance the three kinds of age-based rationing strike between maximizing benefits and fairness. It evaluates whether elements in the proposals are, in fact, contrary to the justifications of these measures. Such shortcomings are highlighted, and it is proposed to adjust prominent proposals to care for the worse off more appropriately and better consider whether the acquired benefits befalls the young or the old. (shrink)

This paper investigates the relationship between some corpuscularian and Aristotelian strands that run through the thought of the sixteenth-century philosopher and physician Julius Caesar Scaliger. Scaliger often uses the concepts of corpuscles, pores, and vacuum. At the same time, he also describes mixture as involving the fusion of particles into a continuous body. The paper explores how Scaliger’s combination of corpuscularian and non-corpuscularian views is shaped, in substantial aspects, by his response to the views on corpuscles and the vacuum in (...) the work of his contemporary, Girolamo Fracastoro. Fracastoro frequently appears in Scaliger’s work as an opponent against whom numerous objections are directed. However, if one follows up Scaliger’s references, it soon becomes clear that Scaliger also shares some of Fracastoro’s views. Like Scaliger, Fracastoro suggests corpuscularian explanations of phenomena such as water rising in lime while at the same time ascribing some non-corpuscularian properties to his natural minima. Like Scaliger, Fracastoro maintains that there is no vacuum devoid of bodies since places cannot exist independently of bodies (although their opinions diverge regarding how exactly the relevant dependency relation might be explicated). Finally, like Scaliger, Fracastoro connects a continuum view of mixture with a theory of natural minima. (shrink)

The well-known formal semantics of conditionals due to Stalnaker Studies in logical theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1968), Lewis, and Gärdenfors The logic and 1140 epistemology of scientific change, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1978, Knowledge in flux, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988) all fail to distinguish between trivially and nontrivially true indicative conditionals. This problem has been addressed by Rott :345–370, 1986) in terms of a strengthened Ramsey Test. In this paper, we refine Rott’s strengthened Ramsey Test and the corresponding analysis of explanatory relations. We (...) show that our final analysis captures the presumed asymmetry between explanans and explanandum much better than Rott’s original analysis. (shrink)

I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...) hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized phenomenally, then Chalmers’ demand that PCS should explain our epistemic situation is misplaced. PCS can explain our epistemic situation only if there is a reductive explanation of consciousness. But according to PCS, no reductive explanation of consciousness can be given. On the other hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized topic-neutrally, then PCS is not only physically explicable, but it also explains our epistemic situation. Either way, PCS is safe. (shrink)

In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...) as they are due to luck. The symmetrical view, we argue, is by far the more compelling, both by internal luck egalitarian standards and in light of the external rightist emphasis on choice and responsibility to which luck egalitarianism may partly be seen as a response. Our main case for the symmetrical view is that when some people, against a background of equal opportunities, do not exercise their responsibility to the same degree as others, they cannot justifiably call for equalizing measures to be put in place. Indeed, such measures would be positively unfair. The symmetrical view, accordingly, rejects compensation in such cases, whereas the asymmetrical view, implausibly, enjoins it. We also examine two objections to this argument. First, that this view fails to qualify as genuinely egalitarian, instead collapsing the notion of equality into the notion of desert. Second, that the opposing asymmetrical view, in contrast to the symmetrical view, can draw support from its compatibility with sufficientarian concerns. Both objections are rebutted. We conclude that luck egalitarians are best served by endorsing the symmetrical, luck-neutralizing stance. (shrink)

Affirmative action is standardly pursued in relation to admissions to prestigious universities, in hiring for prestigious jobs, and when it comes to being elected to parliament. Central to these forms of affirmative action is that they have to do with competitive goods. A good is competitive when, if we improve A’s chances of getting the good, we reduce B’s chances of obtaining the good. I call this Competitive Affirmative Action. I distinguish this from Non-competitive Affirmative Action. The latter has to (...) do with non-competitive goods, e.g., being granted early parole or freedom from arbitrary arrest. I argue that some of the most prominent objections against affirmative action—in particular, the reverse discrimination objection and the merit objection—speak less against Non-competitive Affirmative Action. And that some of the most prominent arguments in favor of affirmative action, insofar as they justify Competitive Affirmative Action, also justify Non-competitive Affirmative Action. (shrink)